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Generalized Grievances and Judicial Discretion
MARK GABEL*

INTRODUCTION

Standing jurisprudence is one of the most obscure areas of the law.'
Like the other justiciability doctrines, standing is a "gatekeeper" doctrine
that may serve as a bar to a plaintiff's claim in federal court.2 The key
factor distinguishing standing from other justiciability doctrines is that it
does not regulate the plaintiff's claim itself, but rather whether the
plaintiff is the proper person to assert that claim.3 Within the law of
standing, generalized grievances may in turn be one of the least clear,
and therefore most poorly understood, areas of doctrine.
Although the Supreme Court has employed the generalized
grievances concept repeatedly in its standing analysis since the 192os, 4 the
term "generalized grievances" did not appear in a federal judicial
opinion until Flast v. Cohen in I968.' The Flast Court held that standing
should be denied "where a taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court as a
forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of
government or the allocation of power in the Federal System., 6 Although
this statement suggested some of the situations in which a generalized
grievance might arise, it did not explain precisely what one is. And in
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2oo7; B.A., University
of California at Berkeley. I would like to thank Professor Evan Tsen Lee for his help in understanding
the complexities -and opacities-of standing jurisprudence in general, and for his guidance on this
Note specifically. Thanks also to the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for their hard work on this
Note, and to my friends and family for their support and encouragement throughout the writing and
editing process.
I. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 6o (3d ed. 2006).
2. Evan Tsen Lee, DeconstitutionalizingJusticiability:The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 603,6o6 (I99i).
3. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-1oo (1968) ("[T]he question is whether the person whose
standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not
whether the issue itself is justiciable."); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note I, at 6o; Lee, supra note 2, at

6o6.
4. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-18o (I974); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Hawthorne, 342
U.S. 429, 434 (1952); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,488 (1923).
5. See Flast, 392 U.S. at Io6.

6. Id.
[1331]
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fact, one could argue that it is still unclear what a generalized grievance is
now, almost forty years and many cases later.7
One reason for this lack of clarity is that the doctrine's definition has
fluctuated over time.8 For example, in Flast, Justice Warren referred to
"generalized grievances about the conduct of government." 9 This
definition suggests that the key issue is the substance of the claim, not the
identity of the claimant. But in Warth v. Seldin, Justice Powell suggested
that the range of potential plaintiffs was an essential matter; he defined a
generalized grievance as a claim in which "the asserted harm is...
shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.""
And in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Scalia seemed to indicate
that a generalized grievance involved both of these factors at once."
Most recently, in FederalElection Commission v. Akins, Justice Breyer
wrote that generalized grievances had "invariably" been found in cases
where both factors were present, but noted that the second factor, a
"widely shared" harm, did not by itself require a court to find a
generalized grievance. 2 That explanation, however, did not make clear
which factors do necessitate finding a generalized grievance.' 3
Ultimately, the current state of the doctrine makes it effectively
impossible to announce a simple definition.' 4 But we can define the
doctrine to some degree. It is important to do so, because the doctrine
raises essential questions that go to the heart of the issue of standing,
with its exacting injury requirements.'5 Relevant issues include what type
7. See Ryan Guilds, Comment, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a

Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1863, I866 (1996) (distilling five different possible
"theories" of the doctrine from the pre-1996 case law).
8. Id.

9. 392 U.S. at io6.
1O. 422 U.S. 490,499 (1975).

Ii. 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) (plaintiff fails to state justiciable claim when alleging "only harm
to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief
that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large").
12. 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998).

13. See The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REv. 122, 253 (1998)
[hereinafter Leading Cases] ("[Tihe Court's resolution of the standing question in Akins, whether by
necessity or design, fails to elucidate the constitutional boundaries of Congress's ability to confer
standing."). Contra CHEMERINSKY, supra note i, at 91 (asserting that Akins clearly defines generalized
grievances as cases in which "plaintiffs sue solely as citizens concerned with having the government
follow the law or as taxpayers interested in restraining allegedly illegal government expenditures").
14. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
15. Injury (sometimes referred to as injury in fact) is one of three requirements for what the
Supreme Court calls "Article I1" or "constitutional" standing. Professor Chemerinsky offered the
following succinct summary of Article III standing:
First, the plaintiff must allege that he or she has suffered or imminently will suffer an
injury. Second, the plaintiff must allege that the injury is fairly traceable to the
defendant's conduct. Third, the plaintiff must allege that a favorable federal court
decision is likely to redress the injury. . . . The latter two requirements-termed
causation and redressability -often have been treated by the Court as if they were a
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of injury the plaintiff must have, whether there are limits on Congress's
ability to grant standing to large, poorly-defined groups of plaintiffs, and
whether plaintiffs, in order to have standing, must suffer an injury
different from the injuries others have suffered from the same harm.
The answers to these questions will help us understand standing
doctrine, but they also implicate our basic notions of fairness and help
define the role of courts in our society. I6 This Note argues that, over time,
two competing visions of the doctrine have struggled for dominance. The
first, epitomized by Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Lujan and
his dissent in Akins, accords with a "private rights" view of standing
jurisprudence.'7 Such a view employs the generalized grievances doctrine
to exclude claims that appear insufficiently specific or individualized. The
other theory, on display in Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Akins,
seeks to vindicate the goals of a "public values" view of standing' 8 (or in
Justice Breyer's case, the goals of his own "active liberty" view of

jurisprudence).'9 Under this theory, generalized grievances should not

bar claims that would be allowed by a common sense view of basic
fairness under the Constitution. This Note argues that, with Federal
Elections Commission v. Akins, the public values view has won out-at
least for now.
Part I of this Note explores the foundations of the generalized

single test ....
CHEMERINSKY, supra note i, at 63. These three elements are said to derive from a mandate, inferred
from Article III, under which federal courts are empowered to hear a claim only if it involves a "caseor-controversy." See, e.g.. Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, i8o-8
(2000).

16. See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1392 (1987) ("[Standing issues] concern the role of law in shaping a self-governing
society.... [T]he question 'who may sue?' is really a question of 'what are rights and how may they
best be effectuated?'-a question at the heart of law.") (citations omitted).
17. Under a "private rights" or "dispute resolution" model of jurisprudence, "the lawsuit is a
vehicle for settling disputes between private parties about private rights.... Litigation is organized as
a contest between two individuals or at least two unitary interests, diametrically opposed." Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976). According

to this model, "[t]he less a lawsuit represents [a contest between] bickering neighbors, the less judicial
intervention is justifiable.... The legitimacy of judicial action depends upon the existence of a genuine
dispute." Lee, supra note 2, at 626-27. Some commentators consider this view to be the traditional
model. See Chayes, supra, at 1282 (arguing that it represents "our received tradition" of
jurisprudence).
i8. Proponents of a "public values" model of jurisprudence argue that the purpose of
adjudication is "to give concrete meaning to our public values, to illustrate how our public and
constitutional values play out in the real world." Lee, supra note 2, at 628 (citations omitted). Under
this view, judges should seek not simply to resolve disputes, but to discover, vindicate and elaborate
those values. See id. For an extended theoretical exposition of the principles underlying the public
values model, see, for example, Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, Forward: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2, 17 (1979).
i9. See generally STEPHEN BREVER, ACrIVE LIBERTY (20O5). For a summary of Justice Breyer's view
of jurisprudence, see infra note 161.
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grievances doctrine, which were laid in three early twentieth century
cases: Fairchild v. Hughes," Frothingham v. Mellon,' and Ex Parte
Levitt." I theorize that the doctrine emerged from the Court's attempts
to exclude plaintiffs whose claims seemed inconsistent with the broad
purposes of federal court adjudication. Two issues that emerged in these
cases have since played a significant role in the Court's generalized
grievances jurisprudence: a reluctance to grant standing to plaintiffs
whose injury is shared by a large number of non-plaintiffs, and
separation of powers concerns. The Court has vacillated on the
significance of both of these issues. 3 In Part II, I discuss the private rights
view of generalized grievances, which tends toward a strict doctrine that
in many cases contravenes congressional intent to provide standing.
After exploring the Court's treatment of generalized grievances doctrine
in the 197OS and I98Os and discussing Justice Scalia's pre-Lujan views,
this Part addresses Lujan itself, which, at the time it was decided,
represented a significant victory for the private rights view. Part III will
outline the public values theory of generalized grievances, exploring how
Akins modifies the doctrine established by Lujan and attempting to
define the doctrine as it stands today. Ultimately, I argue that Justice
Breyer's formulation of the doctrine in Akins is preferable to Justice
Scalia's alternative, which would place unjustifiable limits on Congress's
power to grant access to the federal courts and would leave too many
injured plaintiffs without the opportunity for judicial redress. 4 Part IV
briefly analyzes how courts have applied the doctrine since Akins. The
results of the post-Akins generalized grievances cases, I contend, have
been not only doctrinally correct, but also equitable. I conclude that
although the doctrine remains unsettled in some ways, even an unsettled
public values theory of generalized grievances is preferable to an overly
restrictive private rights formulation.
20.

258

U.S.

126 (1922).

262 U.S. 447 (1923).
22. 302 U.S. 633 (I937).
21.

23. For the Court's equivocation on the first issue, which I refer to as the "widely-shared"
problem, compare Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 8o

(1978) (holding that standing should be denied where the "harm asserted amounts only to a
generalized grievance shared by a large number of citizens in a substantially equal measure"), with
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 678, 687 (1973)
(holding that a group of five law students had standing even though "all persons who utilize the scenic
resources of the country, and indeed all who breathe its air" could potentially claim the same injury as
the plaintiffs). On the separation of powers issue, compare Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 2o8, 222 (1974) (arguing that allowing standing to a generalized grievance would
"distort the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and open the
Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing 'government by injunction'), with Federal Election
Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. I1, 24 (1998) (finding that even if the interest claimed by a plaintiff
might be more readily addressed by the political branches, that "does not, by itself, automatically
disqualify [it] for Article III purposes").
24. See infra Part III.A.2.
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I.

ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE

The generalized grievance concept first appears in recognizable form
in decisions by the Taft Court of the early 1920S." The doctrine did not
stand on its own at first; the Court did not suddenly announce a new rule
excluding "general" or "generalized" complaints. Rather, the Court
prohibited generalized claims as an extension of the requirement of
injury and as a corollary to broader separation of powers concerns. The
Court started in each case with the proposition that the plaintiff's interest
was insufficient to support standing. It then offered the generalized
nature of the claim as evidence supporting that holding.
In Fairchildv. Hughes, the Court rejected an attempt to enjoin the
formal adoption and enforcement of the Nineteenth Amendment, which
had already been ratified by a sufficient number of states to become
law. 6 The "[p]laintiff's alleged interest in the question" was based on his
status as a citizen and taxpayer who objected to the Amendment as an
infringement on the power of the states to control suffrage." Justice
Brandeis wrote that this interest was "not such as to afford a basis for
this proceeding.""' Ostensibly, the rationale was that the plaintiff could
not claim to have been injured by enforcement of the Amendment,
because it did not directly affect him, but only required state election
officials to allow women to vote.29 The Court also noted that the
Amendment impacted the plaintiff less than it did many other
Americans, because it did not change the suffrage laws in his home state
of New York (which had allowed women to vote before ratification)."
Political concerns, however, could not have been far from the
justices' minds. By the time the Court faced the case, the constitutionally
mandated steps for enacting the Nineteenth Amendment were
complete.' It was part of the Constitution "for all Intents and
Purposes."3 Fairchild, then, was not just arguing for the overturning of
an act of Congress; he wanted the Court essentially to delete an

25. See Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 480, 488 (holding that a party seeking standing must show
"direct injury ... not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally")

(emphasis added); James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door:Article I11, The Injury-inFact Rule, and the Framers' Planfor Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RurGEis L. REV. I, 10
(2OO).

26. 258 U.S. 126, 127, 130 (1922). The Nineteenth Amendment provides that "[t]he right ...
vote shall not be... abridged... on account of sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § i.
27.
28.
29.
30.

to

Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 127 (1922).
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id.

31. See U.S. CONST. art. V (prescribing that a constitutional amendment, after being passed by
Congress, "shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several states"); Fairchild,258 U.S. at 127.
32. See Fairchild,258 U.S. at 127.
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Amendment from the Constitution.
Even if the Court had purported to do so, it might have been unclear
whether it was exceeding its rightful powers. By granting standing, the
Court would have implicitly held that it possessed the power to overturn
a legislative enactment ratified by thirty-four state legislatures following
an explicit constitutional procedure.33 If it could invalidate ratified
Amendments, what was to stop the Court from deleting portions of the
Bill of Rights at the behest of a single citizen? Although the Court is of
course an inherently antimajoritarian institution (because it is unelected
and because its judges serve for life), it is extremely unlikely that the
justices failed to consider the antidemocratic implications of what they
were being asked to do.
Amongst these dizzying legal and political concerns, the
pronouncement that "[p]laintiff has only the right, possessed by every
citizen, to require that the government be administered according to law
and that the public moneys not be wasted"34 appears in Fairchildalmost
as an afterthought (and not a very important one). This "general right"
was insufficient for standing purposes because it involved no direct
injury; thus the claim was not an Article III "case."3 Justice Brandeis
said nothing about the widely shared nature of the injury. The Court
rejected "citizen standing" for Fairchild not because it was too broad, but
because it was impractical and imprudent for other, more vital, reasons.
Ex Parte Levitt 6 involved similar political concerns and legal
arguments, and treats the generalized grievances doctrine in a similarly
cursory way. The plaintiff sought to invalidate the appointment of Justice
Black to the Supreme Court, arguing that the appointment was invalid
under Article I, Section 6." As in Fairchild,the political volatility of the
issue and its implications for separation of powers are obvious. Six
months after President Roosevelt first proposed his Court packing plan,"
the justices can hardly have wanted to precipitate a direct constitutional
confrontation by directly considering whether to expel one of
Roosevelt's appointees at the behest of a single disgruntled lawyer.39 Yet
33. See U.S. CONST. art. V; Fairchild,258 U.S. at 127. Even if Fairchild had obtained the remedy
he sought-preventing the Secretary of State from proclaiming the amendment ratified, id.,-the
amendment would arguably have been valid, because the Constitution doesn't require an official
proclamation of the ratification. By issuing the injunction, the Court would have raised grave
constitutional questions by impliedly asserting its authority to halt the ratification process in a way not
explicitly authorized by Article V.
34. Fairchild,258 U.S. at 129.
35. Id.
36. 302 U.S. 633 (937).
37. Id.
38. See

CHEMERINSKY,

supra note i, at 255 (explaining that President Roosevelt proposed the

Court packing plan in March 1937). Levitt was decided in October 1937.32 U.S. at 633.
39. We know that Levitt was a lawyer because the Court referred to him as "a member of the bar
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the Court aloofly failed to acknowledge these concerns."0 Instead, it
based its holding on the plaintiff's lack of a "direct injury," blandly
reciting that he had demonstrated "no interest ...

other than that of a

citizen."'" The Court raised the fact that the plaintiff "ha[d] merely a
general interest common to all members of the public"42 almost casually,
in the second to last sentence of the opinion. Again, the justices used the
generalized nature of the harm primarily as evidence of 4a lack of injury,
appearing less concerned with the former than the latter.
Frothingham is different from Fairchild and Levitt in that it
highlights the generalized grievances concern.45 At the same time, it
introduces the widely-shared concept and discusses the separation of
powers implications of allowing broadly based standing.46 The plaintiff
sought "taxpayer standing"; her alleged injury stemmed from the fact
that she challenged a statute appropriating taxpayer funds. 47 The
appropriation of those funds, she claimed, constituted a taking of her
property without due process of law. 48 The Court denied standing,
holding that Frothingham was required to claim "some direct injury"
stemming from the enforcement of the law, and "not merely that
[s]he
49
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.
To focus on the fact that the plaintiff's claim was widely shared
would be to miss the point of Justice Sutherland's argument. True, the
Court did point out that Frothingham's interest in the case was "shared

of this Court." Levitt, 302 U.S. at 633.
40. See id. The fact that the opinion is per curiam may suggest the justices' awareness of the
political sensitivity of the issue. By refusing, on standing grounds, to address the issue, and doing so in
a single voice, the Court could mollify potential concerns that it would challenge the President's use of
his appointment power.
41. Id. This is not to say that the Court's injury rationale was solely a pretext for avoiding the
political and separation of powers issues. But it was likely at least in part such a pretext.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. In United States v. Richardson, Chief Justice Burger would argue that Levitt was denied
standing because, "whatever [his] injury, it was one he shared with 'all members of the public."' 48
U.S. 166, 179-8o (1974). This seems incorrect. Levitt was not denied standing because he had a widely
shared injury, but rather because he had no measurable injury at all.
45. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-89 (1923).
46. See id.
47. Id. at 479-80. In a taxpayer standing case, the plaintiffs claim of injury is that his taxes are
being used to support or enforce an illegal government action or statute. The plaintiff then attempts to
use this claim to support a facial challenge to the allegedly illegal action or statute.
48. Although 1923 was the heyday of a period during which the Court invalidated a number of
acts of Congress on substantive due process grounds, most of the overturned statutes involved
economic regulation. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note i,at 6o6-o7. Frothingham, in contrast, challenged
the Maternity Act, social legislation designed to reduce infant mortality. Frothingham,262 U.S. at 479.
This distinction may explain why Justice Sutherland's opinion does not bother much with the merits of
the plaintiff's due process claim. See id. at 486-89.
49. Frothingham,262 U.S. at 488.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1331

with millions of others."5 But it did so only In the course of holding that
her interest generally failed to provide a "basis... for an appeal to the
preventative powers of a court of equity."'" The problem was not only
that the interest was widely shared. It was also that it was "comparatively
minute and indeterminable," and that the connection between her taxes
and the statute was "remote, fluctuating and uncertain."5 In other words,
any potential harm to Frothingham from the operation of the statute was
simply so vague and poorly defined that it wasn't clear that there was any
harm at all. The case suggests that no taxpayer can demonstrate a welldefined injury based solely on their taxpayer status, because it is so
difficult to measure the existence and extent of a loss resulting from the
alleged use of some portion of their taxes to enforce a specific statute. 3
Therefore, as in Fairchild and Levitt, the plaintiff's claim of harm was
simply too insubstantial to constitute an injury.
The Court's opinion also raised the specter of the slippery slope,
pointing out that "[i]f one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a
cause, then every other taxpayer may do the same" for any statute
requiring an appropriation of public funds.54 This was the closest the
Court came in Frothingham to holding that widely shared harms are
invalid as such. But even this statement did not amount to a new rule
that generalized claims could not be heard. Rather, the "attendant
inconveniences" inherent in allowing standing to every taxpayer formed
part of the rationale for prohibiting claims based solely on taxpayer
status.5
Justice Sutherland also believed that the plaintiff's claim raised
constitutional concerns associated with separation of powers. 56 He
connected these to the injury analysis. Invalidating a statute without
direct injury, he argued, would infringe on Congress's rightful exercise of
its lawmaking power and would exceed the Court's power "to decide a
judicial controversy."57 Although he did not explain why this would be so,
one could argue that without any harm at all to evaluate, a court can only
evaluate the statute on broad, general facts and pure policy grounds.
50. Id. at 487.
51. Id.
52. Id.

53. The Court eventually recognized a limited basis for taxpayer standing under the taxing and
spending clause of the Constitution in Flast v. Cohen. 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968). Subsequent cases,
however, seem to have limited Flast to its facts -that is, to situations in which the plaintiff is using her
status as a taxpayer to challenge government expenditures as violative of the Establishment Clause.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note i,at94.
54. Frothingham,262 U.S. at 487.

55. See id. ("[Sluch a result, with its attendant inconveniences, goes far to sustain the
conclusion .. .that a suit of this character [i.e., a taxpayer suit] cannot be maintained.") (emphasis
added).

56. Id. at 488-89.
57. Id. at 489.
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What other basis could it have for making a decision in such a case? And
making such pure policy decisions based on general facts is traditionally
a task more in the nature of legislation than adjudication. Thus, the
problem with taxpayer standing in Frothingham ultimately had little to
do with the fact that many people shared the same injury. Rather, the
problem was that any given plaintiff seeking standing under this theory,
considered as an individual, had no definable injury in the first place, and
thus could not state a claim that provided the Court with a basis for
decision on other than pure policy grounds.
Rather than developing new doctrine based on the "generalized"
nature of the claim, the Court in all three of these cases considered a
range of already-existing legal and non-legal factors--lack of injury,
political concerns, and structural constitutional concerns associated with
separation of powers. Assessing these factors together, the justices
judged in each case that the plaintiff was simply not an appropriate
person to bring the claim' 8 That the harm was "general" was a shorthand
or synonym for this notion of "appropriateness." It was a convenient
one, because citizen standing and taxpayer standing have in common that
they theoretically allow for suits by tens of millions of plaintiffs with
identical claims. But in the end it was the insufficiency of each of those
individual potential claims that was the ultimate problem, not their
"general" nature when considered collectively." At its inception, then,
the generalized grievances concept was simply a convenient way for the
Court to describe plaintiffs with deficient claims-an umbrella term
encompassing a variety of reasons to deny standing. It was not an
independent theory of exclusion.
II. PRIVATE RIGHTS VIEW OF GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES
The generalized grievances doctrine eventually came to be
considered a stand-alone doctrine within the Court's standing
jurisprudence. To some extent it was still, as in the Taft Court cases,
58. The idea that these early cases, and to some extent standing doctrine in general, are
ultimately concerned with finding "appropriate plaintiffs" and excluding "inappropriate" ones, was
first suggested to me by Professor Evan Tsen Lee.
59. Lee Albert proposed a similar theory of the generalized grievances doctrine:
Upon finding a litigant to be without any other interest, courts have said that he 'suffers in

some indefinite way in common with people generally' or that the cause is one of public
concern. To infer from this that the collective character of an interest is relevant to its
insufficiency for private standing would be error. A litigant's interest in the lawfulness of
particular government action may be shared with others but whether it is or not is
immaterial to the ruling that he is without standing.... [T]hese expressions do not provide
a reason for the finding of standing; they describe the result. Attribution of the interest to the
public is a figure of speech, expressing the conclusion that general law enforcement must be
left to public officials or the public in its political capacity.
Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for
Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 488-89 (974) (citing Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923))

(emphasis added).
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associated with a lack of individual injury, and as such it fit in well with a
private rights view of standing. Such a view focuses on the idea of a court
case as a way to resolve disputes. Private rights theory is closely related
to the Article III "case or controversy" requirement: under this model, a
"case or controversy" by definition involves a dispute 6° in addition to an
injury to the plaintiff. Justice Powell explained the connection between
standing, dispute resolution. and Article III under the private rights
model in Warth: "[S]tanding imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff
has made out a 'case or controversy' between himself and the defendant
within the meaning of Art. III. This is the threshold question in every
federal case ....
Despite these Article III concerns, the doctrine was still considered
prudential (at least before Lujan). At the same time, however, courts
often invoked another constitutional concern in support of it: a
reluctance, based on separation of powers, to interfere with decisions
made by the political branches of government. 3
It would take Justice Scalia to announce a unified theory by which
the doctrine was (I)required by Article III and (2) mandated by
separation of powers, thus "constitutionalizing" the generalized
grievances concept. 6' To date, Lujan represents the zenith of the private

60. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975).
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1982) (classifying the generalized grievances doctrine as one of "a set of
prudential principles that bear on the question of standing"); Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500 (referring to
the doctrine as one of a group of "limitations closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially
matters of judicial self-governance").
63. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (finding that generalized grievances are "most appropriately
addressed in the representative branches"); Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (stating that a court entertaining a
case involving a generalized grievance would be forced "to decide abstract questions of wide public
significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to [do so]").
64. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74, 576-77 (1992) (stating that "a
plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government... does not state an Article III
case or controversy" and arguing that allowing claims based on "the undifferentiated public interest
in ...compliance with the law" violates separation of powers).
Commentators disagree about exactly when the generalized grievances doctrine changed from a
prudential doctrine to a constitutionally compelled one. Compare Myriam E. Gilles, Representational
Standing: U.S. Ex Rel. Stevens and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 315, 323, 327
(2001) (arguing that standing doctrine as a whole was constitutionalized in Warth and in City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-12 (i983)), with Daniel Patrick Condon, Note, The Generalized
Grievances Restriction: Prudential Restraint or Constitutional Mandate, 70 GEo. L.J. 5157, '170-73
(1982) (arguing that the Court constitutionalized the doctrine earlier, in Schlesinger v. Reservists
Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) and United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(974)).
Given that both Warth and, seven years later, Valley Forge, explicitly state that the doctrine is
prudential, see supra notes 62-63, it seems incorrect to argue that the generalized grievances doctrine
was constitutionalized before those cases. Lujan marks the first time that the Court explicitly barred a
generalized grievance based primarily on Article III standing requirements.
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rights theory of the doctrine in Supreme Court case law, although Justice
Scalia's dissent in Akins6 suggests that, given the chance, he would push
the theory even further. 5
A.

CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES DOCTRINE

Prudential justiciability doctrines are "judicially self-imposed limits
on the exercise of federal jurisdiction. "6 "[U]nlike their constitutional
counterparts, they can be modified or abrogated by Congress." ' This
distinction matters because many federal statutes contain citizen suit
provisions purporting to grant a very broad right to sue.(" If the doctrine69
is prudential, Congress can override it simply by authorizing standing.
A prudential generalized grievances doctrine would therefore never bar
suits under these broadly worded citizen suit provisions. But if the
doctrine is constitutionally mandated, then no generalized grievance can
ever be justiciable, even if a statute authorizes standing for the claim.7" In
that case, claims brought under broadly worded citizen suit provisions
would always be barred if found to be generalized grievances.
I am distinguishing here between a prudential doctrine based on
constitutional concerns and a "constitutionalized" doctrine. As I use the
term here, "constitutionalized" means more than that the Court
mentions the Constitution in its analysis of a given doctrine. By
constitutionalization, I mean the act of judicially construing a standing
doctrine as mandated by the Constitution. Thus, when a court invokes
constitutional concerns, it is not necessarily constitutionalizing;
constitutionalizing involves taking a further step and saying that the
Constitution requires a given result. In its baldest incarnation, a court
might say something like, "We have no power to review this case,
because Article III of the Constitution specifically forbids us to take
jurisdiction over cases involving [for example] manatees."7 ' Of course, it

65. See infra Part II.B.
66. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
67. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 501).
68. For example, broadly worded citizen suit provisions can be found in several key
environmental laws. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (Endangered Species Act) (providing that "any
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf' to enjoin violations and that "the district courts
shall have jurisdiction"); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Clean Water Act) (same). The constitutional/prudential
distinction is thus particularly important to the ability of environmental plaintiffs to gain standing. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note I,at 95-96.
69. See Raines v. Byrd, 52I U.S. 81i, 820 n.3 (1997) ("Congress' decision to grant [standing] ...

eliminates any prudential standing limitations.").
70. Id. ("Congress cannot erase Article III's standing requirements by statutorily granting the
right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.").
71. This invented example uses explicit language to demonstrate the doctrinal move involved. For
an actual, less extreme example, see Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964) ("Our lack of
jurisdiction to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under
which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.").
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is only constitutionalization the first time a court does this-after that, it
is a fait accompli. More precisely, since the Supreme Court is the final
arbiter of the Constitution, it is a fait accompli when that Court does it.
Lower courts can attempt to constitutionalize, but will never have a final
say in the matter.
When the Court grounds a standing doctrine in the Constitution,
several important consequences follow. The first is a loss of judicial
flexibility. The decision is binding on the lower courts, so that lower
court judges are barred from hearing claims based on statutes or
common law principles that violate the doctrine. Instead, when faced
with a claim based on such a statute or principle, the court must hold that
the claim is proscribed by the Constitution. Less obviously, the decision
restricts the rhetorical and analytical flexibility of the Supreme Court
itself. For prudential doctrines, stare decisis requires the Court to
consider itself generally bound, but it may still reverse itself if "good
cause to the contrary is demonstrated."72 To avoid applying a prudential
doctrine, it can either: (i) modify the doctrine so that it operates to reach
the result that the judge thinks correct in the case, (2) hold the doctrine
inapplicable to the situation, or (3) simply repudiate it. It need not
provide much justification for doing these things; some policy ground
invented by the Court or offered by a litigant will suffice. But when a
doctrine is constitutionally compelled, although the Court can still
distinguish a case or clarify the doctrine, it will have to work harder to
justify modifying or eliminating the doctrine.73 If past opinions have said
that Article III requires an injury in fact, the Court will not suddenly
decide on pure policy grounds that it does not. Unless the Constitution
has changed in the interim, it must explain how the Constitution now
requires or permits the new result.74 This will tend to slow down changes
in the constitutionalized doctrine and freeze the current canons in place.

72. Lee, supra note 2, at 6I7.
73. See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 292-93 ("[C]onstitutionally
grounded rules deprive both future courts and Congress of flexibility in defining jurisdictional
requirements ....
Unquestionably, prudential limits on the Court are preferable because they are
more flexible."). This is not to say that the Court cannot overturn established constitutional precedent
when it wishes to. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2oo3) (overruling a prior case
because it "was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain
binding precedent."); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("[I1t is
common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an 'inexorable command,' and certainly it is not
such in every constitutional case.") (citation omitted).
74. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 ("[When this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the
consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective
costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. [Listing several such considerations]."). But when the
Court overrules previous constitutional precedents, it generally expends significant energy on a
lengthy analysis of the propriety of doing so. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567-79 (justifying the
overruling of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
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Furthermore, constitutionalization circumscribes Congress's power
to grant standing by creating statutory rights of action. 75 Therefore, if the
generalized grievances doctrine is prudential, then a court can, at its
discretion, hold that a citizen suit provision grants standing even to a
plaintiff with a "generalized" claim. But if it is mandated by the
Constitution, then Congress lacks the power to grant "generalized"
standing, and a federal court must find a statute that attempts to grant
such standing unconstitutional insofar as it does So. 76 By imposing such
limitations on Congress, the Court actually creates a constitutional
problem by encroaching upon Congress's constitutionally granted
authority over federal court jurisdiction.77
Litigants' rights are plainly affected when constitutionalization
narrows the range of choices for Congress and the courts. When a litigant
brings a claim in a borderline standing case, the courts are less free to
interpret standing doctrine broadly to allow the plaintiff's claim. 7' The
Supreme Court may be less willing to modify the doctrine to allow
standing to a sympathetic plaintiff. And if Congress believes that the
constitutionalized doctrine unfairly bars litigants from court, its ability to
affect the situation is limited.
i. The Seeds of Constitutionalization
Before Lujan, and particularly in the 1970s and I98os, the Court
confused the issue of whether the generalized grievances concept was
prudential or constitutional by invoking constitutional grounds for the
doctrine while at the same time explicitly calling it prudential.79 The
constitutional grounds involved separation of powers concerns about
courts making policy decisions more properly reserved to Congress and
the President. Effectively, the justices were saying that these
institutional competence issues provided a policy justification for denying
standing to generalized claims, but did not compel courts to refuse
jurisdiction in the same way that an absence of Article III standing
would.8 ' It is reasonable to take the Court at its word and assume that

75. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 8I, 820 n.3 (1997) ("Congress cannot erase Article III's standing
requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have
standing.").
76. See id.
77. See infra Part II.A.

78. See Gilles, supra note 64, at 315 n.2, explaining:
[T]he landmark constitutional cases of the last century ... were driven by private plaintiffs
who sought not only redress for the harms they had personally suffered, but also protection
for society at large against those harms. The Court's constitutionalized standing doctrine
has effectively neutered the popular force that powered these reformative enterprises.
79. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.

81. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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before Lujan the doctrine was prudential . ' At the same time, many preLujan cases did suggest a connection between Article III and a bar on
generalized grievances. 8' Thus, Justice Scalia's opinion in Lujan properly
traced the kernel of his constitutionalization argument back as far as
Fairchild,even though he exaggerated when he said that the earlier cases
had "consistently held" that generalized grievances conflicted with
Article Ill. 4
Two separate constitutional arguments about generalized grievances
wind through the cases that Justice Scalia cited in Lujan to support his
constitutionalization argument. "5The first idea, articulated in Fairchild,
is that a claim based on taxpayer standing "is not a case, within the
meaning of section 2 of Article Ill."8 Justice Sutherland further
explained in Frothingham that the claimed injury in such a case is
"remote, fluctuating, and uncertain," because the plaintiff can allege a
violation of the Constitution, but cannot show a clear connection
between the violation of the law and any measurable harm to her own
interests.8' As already noted, this argument is really saying that a plaintiff
claiming taxpayer standing lacks injury, not that her claim is barred
because many people share it. 8
The Court in Ex Parte Levitt,89 and much later in Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War,' extended the same argument to
cases involving citizen standing, in which the plaintiff's only claim of
injury is that the law has not been followed. 9' The lack of measurable
harm is even more obvious in citizen standing cases than in taxpayer
suits, because plaintiffs in citizen standing cases do not even claim an
injury to economic interests. As a result, as Justice Burger put it, "it can
be only a matter of speculation whether the claimed violation has caused
concrete injury to the particular respondent." 9 Any claimed injury is
"abstract" and therefore difficult to measure.93 Again, however, while
these decisions are based on Article Ill-related concerns about injury,
82. Contra Condon, supra note 64, at 1170-73 (arguing that two 1974 cases constitutionalized the
generalized grievances doctrine eighteen years before Lujan).
83. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 574-77 (1992) (citing cases).
84. See id.
85. See id. at 574-76.
86. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922).
87. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
89. 302 U.S. 633 (937).
90. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
91. Shlesinger, at 226-27 (contrasting a "generalized grievance" with a "case or controversy");
Levitt, 302 U.S. at 633 (holding that a litigant lacks standing unless "he [can] show that he has
sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, a direct injury" and that "a general interest
common to all members of the public" does not satisfy that requirement).
92. Schlesinger,418 U.S. at 223.
93. Id.
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they do not deal directly with the "generalized" nature of the injury.
Rather, each plaintiff, considered separately, has an insufficient claim.
This is likely why the generalized grievances doctrine was still considered
prudential before Lujan. Plaintiffs in certain categories-such as those
who sue as taxpayers or citizens-both lack injury and have broad claims
that may be related to a "generalized" violation of the law. But the Court
did not consider those two factors to be invariably connected.
The other constitutional argument running through the pre-Lujan
cases is based on separation of powers concerns.' These centered around
fears of interfering with the policy-making authority of Congress and the
President." In United States v. Richardson, for instance, Justice Burger
argued that claims based on taxpayer standing were "committed to the96
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.
Although Richardson could not prove Article III injury, he retained "the
right to assert his views in the political process," and that process was the
proper forum for his claim, not the courts.' Similarly, in Schlesinger,
Justice Burger wrote that allowing citizen standing to plaintiffs without
"concrete injury" would "distort the role of the Judiciary in its
relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and open the Judiciary
' '8
to an arguable charge of providing 'government by injunction. , ,
Significantly, although Justice Sutherland had made a similar argument
in Frothingham,9 Justice Burger did not emphasize it in Schlesinger.
Rather, he used it only as a rejoinder to the plaintiffs' argument that
someone must have standing to require a court to enjoin unconstitutional
government action.'" Thus, it is unlikely he considered it crucial to the
outcome of the case. In fact, before Lujan, a separation of powers
argument that a grievance was generalized had never been used as
primary basis for denying standing. Frothingham,Levitt, Richardson, and
Schlesinger all ultimately denied standing because of a lack of injury, not
because of separation of powers concerns. '
In 1983, however, while a judge on the D.C. Circuit, Justice Scalia
94. See, e.g., Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 222, 227; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, I79
(1974).

95. This line of reasoning implicitly repudiates Justice Warren's statement in Flast v. Cohen that
standing "does not.., raise separation of powers problems related to improper judicial interference in
areas committed to other branches of the Federal Government." 392 U.S. 83, ioo (1968).
96. Richardson,418 U.S. at 179.
97- ld.

98. Schlesinger,418 U.S. at 222 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 131 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
too. See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 227: Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
IoI. On Frothingham and Levitt, see supra text accompanying notes 58-59 and 87-88. On

Richardson, see 418 U.S. at 177, 179-8o (explaining that plaintiff "has not alleged that, as a taxpayer,
he is in danger of suffering any particular concrete injury as a result of the operation of this statute").
With regard to Schlesinger, see 418 U.S. at 220 (denying citizen standing "because of the necessarily
abstract nature of the injury").
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wrote a law review article articulating a separation of powers rationale
for constitutionalizing generalized grievances. I"2 He argued that standing
doctrine in general restricts courts to their "traditional undemocratic role
of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the
majority.""'° Under this theory, injury is a good indicator of whether a
court should hear a case, because a plaintiff who is directly harmed by a
law requires protection from the court, whereas a plaintiff who objects to
a law that does not injure her requires no such protection. Furthermore,
when judges attempt to decide cases not involving individual injury, they
must be attempting to vindicate the interests of the majority, since their
intervention is not required to protect the minority.' 4 Deciding such
issues would be "even more undemocratic," Justice (then-Judge) Scalia
argued, because it is properly the role of the elected branches, not the
inherently aristocratic and (because appointed for life) politically
unaccountable judiciary."'° All of this is simply to say that separation of
powers concerns, not just Article III, compel the plaintiff to show injury
to get standing.
But Justice Scalia took the theory one step further: he claimed that
separation of powers barred some widely shared injury just because it was
widely shared, even if the plaintiff could claim a concrete injury."'6 This
theory essentially claimed that sufficiently widely shared injuries were
constitutionally barred. If a statute granted standing to too large a group
of potential litigants, he argued that a showing of injury "would not
suffice to mark out a subgroup of the body politic requiring protection"
by the courts."'7 Yet Justice Scalia did not explain very well how this
prudential concern about institutional roles empowered the courts to
ignore Congress's overt intent to grant standing. His argument appears
to have been that such a statute would constitute an impermissible
attempt by Congress to delegate its role of protecting majority interests
to the antimajoritarian branch."'8
The irony of this position is striking. Justice Scalia was saying that in
order to avoid abusing their own "undemocratic" powers, courts should
refrain from taking a case that the democratically elected Congress wants
the courts to hear."9 Yet ignoring an express grant of jurisdiction by

17

lO2. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
U. L. REV. 88i (1983).
103. Id. at 894.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 894, 896.

SUFFOLK

io6. Id. at 895-96.
107. Id.
io8. Cf id. at 896 ("There is surely no reason to believe that an alleged governmental fault of such
general impact would not receive fair consideration in the normal political process.").
to9. See Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and

Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REv.613, 647 (I999) (arguing that Justice Scalia's argument is "weak" because,
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Congress just because the outcome affects a large group of people usurps
majority power more than it would to simply follow the majority's wishes
by deciding the case. " '
2.
Constitutionalizationin Fact: LUJAN V. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE
In Lujan, Justice Scalia drew on both threads of constitutional
argument running through the earlier cases, and gave a new twist to the
separation of powers argument. "' Weaving these arguments together, he
built a strong case that the generalized grievances doctrine is mandated
by the Constitution.' 2
First, Justice Scalia argued that Article III definitively barred claims
by plaintiffs "raising only a generally available grievance about
government.'' 3 He defined generalized claims as those "claiming only
harm to [the plaintiff's] and every citizen's interest in proper application
of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and
tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large."'" 4 Moreover, he
applied the generalized grievances doctrine to exclude a claim that
seemed to be explicitly authorized by Congress." 5 This itself was an
important doctrinal move that no earlier case had made. Frothingham,
Levitt, Richardson, and Schlesinger had all denied standing to a taxpayer
or a citizen suing as such, in cases where there was no specific statutory
right of action.", 6 Congress had apparently intended to grant "any
person" a right to sue to remedy any violation of the Endangered Species
Act." 7 But the Court in Lujan said that a violation of the Act, by itself,
was an insufficient injury to grant standing, because it amounted to a
generalized grievance, which was constitutionally barred." 8 As a result, a
plaintiff suing under the citizen suit provision in Lujan-or any other
by granting standing in a statute, Congress showed that it ha[d] concluded "that relevant people
should have access to the courts in order to ensure that the (democratically enacted) law is enforced").
ito. Justice Scalia explicitly acknowledged in his article that his standing theory undermined
congressional power, commenting that it was no loss for "important legislative purposes, heralded in
the laws of Congress," to be indefensible in the courts. Scalia, supra, note IO2 at 897. For other
criticisms of the arguments Justice Scalia made in this article, see Sunstein, supra note lO9, at 646-47.
itt.

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,573-78 (1992).

112.

See id.

113. Id. at 573.
I 4 - Id.
115. The plaintiffs in Lujan claimed that the Department of the Interior had violated the Act by
issuing an impermissible regulation and then applying the regulation so as to harm endangered species
that plaintiffs wished to observe. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559, 562-64. The citizen suit provision of the
Endangered Species Act authorizes "any person to commence a civil suit on his own behalf" to (a)
"enjoin any person, including the United States... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of
th[e] Act," or to (b) force the Department of the Interior to fulfill certain of its responsibilities under
the statute; and expressly granted district courts jurisdiction to order appropriate remedies. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g).
116. See supra note sol.
117. See supra note I15.
118. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577-78.
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broadly worded citizen suit provision-had to demonstrate Article III
injury independent of the statutory violation."9 Constitutionalization was
the only way that the Court could have reached this result, because it had
to override legislative intent to do so. Essentially, the case held that the
citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act was
unconstitutional to the extent that it allowed standing where the plaintiff
could not demonstrate individual injury. 0
With regard to separation of powers, the Court trotted out the old
argument from Frothingham that deciding cases based on broadly based
claims would usurp the policy-making power of another branch.''
However, Justice Scalia also added a new twist. He claimed that if
Congress could proclaim a violation of the law by the executive to be a
valid injury for standing purposes, it would force the courts to infringe
upon "the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take
. This was an ingenious
care that the laws be faithfully executed .....
doctrinal move, because it argued that an overbroad congressional grant
of standing violated separation of powers in two separate ways: it
infringed on both political branches' policy-making authority, and it
intruded on executive power. Justice Scalia emphasized through the
forcefulness of his language that these arguments were not merely
prudential; they mandated a finding that the prohibition on generalized
grievances was constitutional.'23
Lujan has been excoriated by many commentators.'24 Most of the
attacks have focused on the injury arguments,' 5 but the separation of
powers arguments are also subject to a number of objections. For one
thing, Justice Scalia overstated the extent to which broad citizen suit
provisions transfer the Executive's power to enforce the laws to the
courts. Congress has anticipated and compensated for potential problems
ii9. Id.
120.

Cf.David A. Logan, Standingto Sue: A ProposedSeparation of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wis. L.

REv. 37, 58 (1984) Logan proposed essentially the argument as that in the text:
[I]f Congress passes a statute declaring that certain behavior is proscribed and then allows
,any person' to sue to enforce that statute, does 'any person' in fact have standing to sue
irrespective of whether that person can assert any injury to himself? . . . [No, because]
article III's requirement that a plaintiff be 'injured' would control and render that statute
unconstitutional.
Id. at 60.
121. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577.
122.

Id.

123. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (recognizing standing based solely on statutory requirements, without

the presence of a separate injury, "would be discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and
distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch-one of the essential elements that identifies those
'Cases' and 'Controversies' that are the business of the courts rather than of the political branches.")
(emphasis added).
124. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failureof Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 301, 316-18 (discussing Lujan under the heading "Standing's Absurdities").
125. See, e.g., id.
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in this area, because "diligent prosecution" provisions in many citizen
suit statutes expressly safeguard executive enforcement authority against
interference from such citizen suits.,, 6 These provisions prohibit citizen
suits wherever the government is already pursuing a case against the
same defendant for the same alleged wrongdoing.'2 7 For example, citizen
suits against private parties to enforce the Clean Water Act (CWA) are
preempted when: (I) the government begins and is "diligently
prosecuting" its own enforcement action against the same defendant; (2)
a state has done so; or (3) the defendant has already paid penalties for
the same violation. 28 Citizen suits under the CWA may proceed if they
were filed before the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) files its
own action, but all the EPA needs to do to exclude the possibility of a
citizen suit is to bring its case first.'29 Since Lujan, in fact, the Court itself

has pointed out that concerns about citizen suits inhibiting executive
enforcement are easily overstated.'30
More broadly, both infringement on the political process and
encroachment upon executive power are to some extent endemic in the
courts' institutional role. Indeed, they are not even all that uncommon.
Every time a court invalidates a statute, it interferes with the political
process, and every time it invalidates a regulation, it interferes with the
executive's enforcement of the laws. It is precisely the Court's role to
correct errors and check overreaching by the political branches. 3 ' It is
therefore illogical to characterize its attempts to do so as a threat to the
separation of powers principle. Justice Scalia believes that the
countermajoritarian nature of the Court requires it to exercise a strong
measure of self-restraint with regards to situations where the rights of the
other branches are implicated.'32 But even if this is true, judicial selfrestraint is very different from a constitutional mandate to deny standing.
Furthermore, arguing for judicial self-restraint is almost bizarre in

126. Jonathan E. Wells, Comment, Shouldn't Standing Be Closer to the Heart of Congressional
Intent?, 49 EMORY L.J. '359, 1395 (2000).
127. Id. ("[Citizen suits do not pose separation of powers problems. Every citizen suit provision
precludes filing of the action if the United States is prosecuting a case against the violator.").
128. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(i)-(iii).
129. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(B); see 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (Clean Water Act provision

providing for preemption of citizen suits under certain circumstances).
130. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. I67, t88 n.4 (20oo). The
Court states:
Certainly the federal Executive Branch does not share the dissent's view that such suits
dissipate its authority to enforce the law .... [T]he Federal Government retains the power
to foreclose a citizen suit by undertaking its own action .... And if the Executive Branch
opposes a particular citizen suit, the statute allows the ... EPA to 'intervene as a matter of
right.'
131. See Sunstein, supra note iO9, at 647-48 (arguing that it does not violate Article III for a court
to decide whether the Executive has violated or failed to enforce the law).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
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this context, because a standing rule that partially invalidates a statute
that purports to grant jurisdiction, as in Lujan, is the epitome of
antimajoritarian judicial usurpation.'33 After all, the legislature is
powerless to confer standing if the courts refuse to recognize it. If
Congress intends to grant standing, but a court turns away plaintiffs who
try to take advantage of it, the court has directly stripped Congress of its
discretion to create rights of action. To nullify statutes in the name of
separation of powers is therefore to invite charges of hypocrisy.
B.

THE GOALS OF THE PRIVATE RIGHTS VIEW OF STANDING: DRAWING
BRIGHT LINES

In his dissent in Akins, Justice Scalia merges the generalized
grievances doctrine with the requirement of a particularized injury in
fact."M While this theory never became law, it suggests one way that a
private rights view of the generalized grievances doctrine might develop.
In the course of explaining why he thought the plaintiff in Akins could
state only a generalized grievance, Justice Scalia directly contrasted
"generalized" and "particularized" grievances, arguing that by definition
a generalized grievance was not particularized.'35 By particularized, he
meant that the alleged injury must "affect the plaintiff in a personal and
individual way."' I6 He contrasted this with a generalized grievance, which
he said involves an "undifferentiated" interest-one "common to all
members of the public."'37 Because current Article III standing doctrine
requires that "the complained of injury be particularized and
differentiated, rather than common to all the electorate,' ' I. under this
theory the generalized grievances doctrine loses its independent life. It
simply becomes a corollary of the particularity requirement; if an injury
is not sufficiently particularized, it is a generalized grievance.
Though this approach has the advantage of apparent simplicity, in
practice it is very difficult to distinguish between particularized harms
and undifferentiated ones. Justice Scalia attempted to demonstrate the
difference by comparing a mass tort with the claim of standing based on
the Accounts Clause of the Constitution in United States v. Richardson.'39
He argued that when a number of plaintiffs suffer burned arms in a mass
tort case, their injuries are particularized and differentiated, because
133. See supranote

1o and accompanying text.
134. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,34-36 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
135. Id. at 35-36.
136. Id. at 35 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 56o (1992)).
137. Id. Justice Scalia is careful to note that "it is a gross oversimplification to reduce the concept
of a generalized grievance to nothing more than 'the fact that [the grievance] is widely shared."' Id. at
35. The key problem, he believes, is that the plaintiff fails to allege some unique or greater injury that
others suffering the same harm do not. Id.
138. Id. at 36.
139. Akins, 524 U.S. at 35-36.
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each plaintiff suffers a burn, and each plaintiff's burned limb is distinct
from the others.'4 ° In contrast, when a plaintiff is denied access to
information, even though he has a legal right to the information, the
harm is "undifferentiated," and therefore a generalized grievance,
because his injury is "precisely the same as the harm caused to everyone
else"-a denial of access to the same information. 4 ' However, it is
entirely plausible to characterize the first harm as undifferentiated and
the second as particularized. We might say that each burn victim suffers
exactly the same harm (a burned arm), such that their injury is
undifferentiated. Similarly, the denial of access to information could be
particularized and differentiated. Each person has her own, personal,
statutorily granted right to certain information, and if not granted access
to that information suffers a unique injury because she is a different
person. Almost any widely shared injury could similarly fall on either
side of the particularized/generalized divide. This dichotomy therefore
does not help to identify a generalized grievance.
Justice Scalia's focus on particularity also means that he would
classify some relatively small harms (say, minor personal injury claims)
as injuries in fact, but certain more serious harms (such as failures by the
EPA to enforce the Clean Air Act, which could lead to serious health
problems nationwide) as generalized grievances not justiciable no matter
how severe they are. This result is perverse. Even if the courts' function
is to redress injuries to individuals, if a harm to only one person grants
standing, a greater harm to a larger number of people should also.
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has recognized this problem.'42 The
traditional-by now, almost rote-response to this objection has been
that the political process provides an adequate mode of redress for such
injuries.'43 But as the Court itself acknowledges, that process can be
"slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive," and may therefore in fact be an
insufficient forum for addressing such injuries."4

140. Id. at 35 ("Even if both [possible plaintiffs] suffer burned arms they are different arms.")
(emphasis in original).
141. Id. at 35-36.
142. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688
(1973) ("To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured because many others are also injured,
would mean that the most injurious and widespread.., actions could be questioned by nobody. We
cannot accept that conclusion.").
143. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 48 U.S. 208, 227 (1974); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (974) ("Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Article III
jurisdiction does not impair the [plaintiff's] right to assert his views in the political forum or at the
polls.").
144. Richardson, 48 U.S. at 179. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical. Suppose that
three months after his inauguration, a new President appoints an EPA Administrator who
immediately ceases to enforce the Clean Air Act. Studies show that without the clean air standards
embodied in the Act, rates of asthma and cardiopulmonary disease are likely to rise sharply, and those
with such diseases are likely to get sicker. Yet until these effects surface, no one may be able to get
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Justice Scalia's mode of reasoning is designed to draw bright lines:
particularized/generalized, constitutional/unconstitutional. Moreover, he
implicitly errs on the side of excluding some plaintiffs who may have
valid injuries instead of granting standing to all such plaintiffs at first, and
then sorting out any frivolous or politically sensitive claims in the
pleading stages. These doctrinal moves support a private rights model of
standing jurisprudence, to which Justice Scalia subscribes.'45 If the goal is
rapid, efficient dispute resolution, excluding borderline cases may serve
to ensure that the Court does not get bogged down with difficult,
politically sensitive matters. Furthermore, a proponent of this view might
argue that a strong generalized grievances doctrine, by preventing
plaintiffs from advocating broad public interests, requires the courts to
focus on resolving disputes between individuals. Moreover, the argument
would continue, the plaintiff can always resort to the political process as
a fallback position if she cannot get standing.' 46
III. PUBLIC VALUES VIEW OF GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES
With regards to standing doctrine in general, proponents of the
private rights theory have gained the upper hand in recent decades.'47
Although both public values and private rights theories of jurisprudence
are vigorous and relevant today, 4 the success of the doctrine of Article
III injury, with its emphasis on the "case or controversy" requirement,49
represents a jurisprudential victory for the dispute resolution model.
Judges who believe in a public values model and are concerned with
protecting public values through decisions in individual cases have
limited doctrinal maneuvering room within the dominant "case or
controversy"
standing
framework.'°
Stare
decisis
and
the
constitutionalization of the injury in fact requirement force them "to
standing to challenge the Administrator's failure to perform her statutory duties, because no one can
show particularized injury in fact, even though the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision ostensibly
provides a fight to sue.
What political redress is available in this situation? Both the President and his EPA Administrator
are invulnerable to short term attack by the electorate, since the President is just beginning his term
and the Administrator is unelected. The President might ignore popular outrage on this matter; some
presidents will stick to unpopular policies despite lack of popular support. Congress's options are
limited: (I)defund other programs in retaliation (which may or may not be effective and will harm
those other programs unduly); (2) hold hearings (which may have no effect at all); (3)impeach the
President (likely politically untenable, perhaps overkill, and of dubious legality). A more effective
solution: allow someone to sue, under the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision, to require the EPA
Administrator to do her duty and enforce the Act.
145. See Lee, supra note 2, at 626-27.
146. See supra note 143.
147. See Lee, supranote 2, at 626.
148. Id.
149. Id. (arguing that private rights-oriented judges have "used Article III to enshrine the dispute
resolution vision in the Constitution").
i5o. Id. at 626.
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couch their own endeavor in dispute resolution terms. '' 5. .
In 1998, Akins presented this problem with regards to generalized
grievances specifically. To grant standing in that case, a public valuesoriented judge would have to reconcile the case law-especially Lujanwith an innate sense that it would be unjust to deny standing to the
plaintiffs, whom the government argued could not demonstrate a
concrete, particularized injury. 5 The Court resolved this quandary in
Akins by deconstitutionalization-that is, by classifying the generalized
grievances doctrine as prudential rather than compelled by the
Constitution.'53 As a result, federal courts post-Akins have increased
maneuvering room to allow congressional grants of jurisdiction to stand.
Because Akins gives greater effect to rights of action granted by
Congress than Lujan did, it allows more plaintiffs standing to request
relief for statutory violations, and thereby provides a forum for
aggressive judicial enforcement of the public values embedded in those
statutes. The Akins Court also left at least one loose end in its explication
of generalized grievances; the current doctrine is therefore malleable and
subject to judicial manipulation. 4 Nevertheless, this flexibility has not
caused significant interpretive difficulties for subsequent courts applying
Akins, nor has it led to incorrect or unfair decision making.'55
A.

DECONSTITUTIONALIZING GENERALIZED GREIVANCES

Grounding generalized grievances doctrine in Article III and
separation of powers concerns, as the Court did in Lujan, restricts the
ability of the federal courts to implement public values. The most

151. Id. (referring to the attempts of public values-oriented justices to work within the private
rights model as "an intellectually disastrous enterprise"); see also Bandes, supra note 73, at 229.
("[T]he unstated acceptance of the private rights model ...leads to contorted logic when the Court
wishes to deviate from [that] model.").
152. Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court in Akins provides an excellent example of a judge
attempting to vindicate majoritarian values while navigating within the confines of the Court's strict
Article III jurisprudence. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. II, 20-21 (1998) (citations
omitted). One of his tactics is to articulate the established doctrine, but then skate fairly quickly over
the facts and analysis, reaching a decision almost conclusorily. In this way, he avoids being drawn into
the quagmire of meeting Justice Scalia on his own terms and arguing the concreteness or particularity
elements in detail. Instead, he places as much emphasis on the public interest involved (the usefulness
of the information sought by the plaintiffs) and the majoritarian nature of his holding (the statute
requires the information to be made available) as on the doctrinal elements. See id. (concluding that
harm to plaintiff qualifies as injury in fact). Another, related mode of reasoning is to aggressively
distinguish unfavorable precedents on their facts, so that it is not necessary to distinguish them on the
law (which would, again, require the judge to grapple in detail with the undesirable doctrine). See id.
at 21-23 (distinguishing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) from Akins on its facts).
153. See Sunstein, supra note log, at 643-45 (using Lujan as an example of how "[b]efore Akins, it
was fair to say that the bar on generalized grievances was moving from a prudential one to one rooted
in Article III," and arguing that after Akins, it "is retained as ...prudential").
154. See infra Part III.B.
155. See infra Part IV.
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important context for this problem is the situation in Lujan and Akins, in
which a statute's citizen suit provision appears to grant standing, but the
defendant questions whether the plaintiff is sufficiently injured., 6 The
strict private rights view, as laid out in Lujan, requires concrete and
particularized injury in this situation, in service of the "case or
controversy" requirement.'5 7 If the statute purports to grant standing to
insufficiently injured plaintiffs, it is invalid-indeed, unconstitutional-to
111.158
that extent, because the injury requirement is compelled by Article
In the same situation, a public values-oriented judge would focus on
interest underlying the statute. To a large degree, this is an
public
the
issue of enforcing legislative intent: if the statute is designed to minimize
workplace injury, then the court, in making its decision, should seek to
vindicate that goal. But a certain amount of judicial discretion enters the
project also. The judge may see a public benefit inherent in the statuteperhaps one that has become apparent in the decades since a venerable
law was passed-and may seek to further that benefit as well. Before a
judge can effectively vindicate these values, however, the statute must be
of
broadly enforceable. Because Lujan's constitutionalization
generalized grievances requires denying standing to many plaintiffs
attempting to litigate actual violations of the statute, it limits the
situations in which the courts may vindicate the public values underlying
the statute.' 59 Thus, Lujan, if enforced, may impede the enforcement of
public values.
These values are better served by a theory of the doctrine that
comes closer to allowing standing in situations where Congress intended
to provide it. After all, if Congress attempted to grant standing in a given
situation, it must have believed that its statutory purpose would be best
served if plaintiffs in that situation had a cause of action. To achieve this
effect within the context of current Article III jurisprudence, a court
might say that when Congress granted standing to challenge violations of
a law, it intended for courts to consider plaintiffs per se injured by such
violations. '6° In effect, this holding would classify a legal injury as an
injury in fact.
Congress's Power to Create New Injuries in Fact
i.
Justice Breyer employed this doctrinal move in a limited context in
156. Akins, 524 U.S. at 19-26; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,557-67 (1992).
157. E.g. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
158. See supra note I 2o and accompanying text.
159. Justice Blackmun, in dissent in Lujan, recognized this. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 6o6 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("[A]s a general matter, the courts owe substantial deference to Congress' substantive
purpose in imposing a certain procedural requirement.").
I6o. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 485 (1993) (arguing that standing should be available whenever
Congress authorizes it by statute).
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his opinion for the majority in Akins. 16 , On its face, the statute in Akins
allowed the plaintiffs to sue in federal court to challenge the Federal
Election Commission's dismissal of their complaint in an administrative
adjudication. ' Nevertheless, the government argued that the plaintiffs,
who complained of just such a dismissal, lacked injury in fact. Indeed,
it would have been difficult for the plaintiffs to show exactly how they
had been harmed by their alleged injury, the inability to get a specific
piece of information about a specific political group. How could they
prove that the information would have changed their ability to make free
choices in the voting booth? The public values model was squarely
implicated, because if the government's interpretation of the injury in
fact requirement under that statute were correct, virtually no one would
be able to meet that standard. Thus, although "Congress ...intended to
authorize this kind of suit, ' 64 the citizen suit provision would be

rendered virtually useless, and Congress's goal of increasing access to
voting information by allowing judicial review of Commission decisions
would be frustrated. However, the Court saved the claim by reframing
the concept of injury under the Federal Election Campaign Act. It held
that a violation of the statute's information disclosure requirements in
itself constituted an injury: "a plaintiff suffers an 'injury in fact' when
[she] fails to obtain 6sinformation which must be publicly disclosed
pursuant to a statute."'
This holding directly conflicted with Justice Scalia's finding in Lujan
that an Article III injury was required even if the statute purported to

I6i. Justice Breyer holds something like a traditional public values view of adjudication. See
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 17 (20O5) [hereinafter BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY] (arguing that judges

"should try to find and finally say" what is the purpose underlying each statute.). He believes that the
courts should allow "constitutional room ...for citizens, through their elected representatives, to
govern themselves." Id. at to. As a result, he argues, "it should be possible to trace without much
difficulty a line of authority for the making of governmental decisions back to the people themselveseither directly, or indirectly through those whom the people have chosen. . . .And this authority
should be broad." Id. at 15.
This view suggests that the courts, when in doubt, should defer to Congress ("those whom the
people have chosen") on issues involving important governmental decisions. That, in turn, suggests
that the Court should defer to Congress's decision to grant standing.
However, Justice Breyer's perspective differs from an orthodox public values model in two ways.
First, he does not seek to vindicate public values directly through judicial decision making so much as
through carrying out congressional intent, which in turn reflects the popular will. See BREYER, supra
(explaining that "judicial restraint" is proper and that courts should not engage in lawmaking).
Second, judges must occasionally "offer protection against governmental infringement of" certain
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, "including infringement by democratic majorities," thus
frustrating majoritarian objectives. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
245, 249-250 (2oo2) [hereinafter Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution].
162. United States Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. II, 19 (1998).
163. Id. at 18-19.
164. Id. at 20.
I65. Id. at 21.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1331

grant redress for any violation.'" By doing so, it undermined the
grounding of the generalized grievances doctrine in Article III and
removed a barrier to broad congressional grants of standing. Although
injury was still required, the Court was indicating that, contrary to Lujan,
the injury need not always be independent of the statute. If Congress
granted standing, the plaintiff could demonstrate injury simply by
showing that she suffered
the harm for which the citizen suit provision
6
prescribed a remedy.'

,

In the larger standing context, there was nothing revolutionary
about the Court's analysis in this respect, except insofar as it conflicted
with Lujan. The Court had several times before held that "Congress may
enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
'68
standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute."
Commentators had also long been arguing that the issue of standing
should hew closer to legal interests that Congress intended to create.' 69 In
Lujan, Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence in which he
emphasized that "Congress . .. has the power to define injuries and

articulate chains of causation where none existed before."' 7 Indeed,
since Justice Kennedy joined the Akins majority, he must have felt that
Congress had done exactly that in the Federal Election Campaign Act.
Nevertheless, by applying this principle to a case claimed to be a
generalized grievance, Justice Breyer effected a significant shift in the
law. By allowing Congress to define a statutory violation as an injury, the
Court essentially was holding that, with regards to such statutes, the
plaintiff has a "right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the
166. See supra text accompanying notes 113-20.

67. One could argue that this holding only applies to cases similar to Akins, where the statute
grants a statutory right to information. See Sunstein, supra note to9, at 642-43. After all, Justice
Breyer did not proclaim a broad rule putting the standing question "in the hands of Congress," nor did
he explicitly overrule Lujan on this point. Id. Regardless of how broad the holding, however, it is clear
that Akins undermines Lujan at least to some extent, because Lujan would seem not to allow for
standing in the Akins situation-hence Justice Scalia's dissent in Akins. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 29-37
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (I973) (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concurring.)); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514

(975) ("Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can
confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in
the absence of statute."); Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212 (White, J., concurring) (noting that a statutory
right of action supported a finding of standing where there would otherwise be none).
169. See, e.g., I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrIUTIONAL LAW 397 (3d ed. 2000) ("there is
good reason to afford Congress a wide berth in specifying ...new forms of 'injury"'); William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 290-91 (1988) ("Standing ... is a question of
substantive law, and the answers to standing questions will vary as the substantive law varies.");
Logan, supra note 120, at 42 ("In the statutory context, the Court should uniformly... accord[] great
deference to Congress' power to provide judicial redress to parties asserting even novel claims with
attenuated causal relationships.").
170. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Government be administered according to law." 1And that concept had
traditionally
been
associated
with
nonjusticiable
generalized
grievances. "2 Thus, the Court in Akins loosened Article III standing in
cases where a statute prescribes a broad right of action.
2.
Deconstitutionalizationand the DemocraticProcess
As already discussed, reversing Lujan's constitutionalization of
generalized grievances furthers majoritarian goals because Lujan, by
rejecting standing authorized by Congress, "recommends judicial
invalidation of the outcomes of democratic processes."'73 However,
Justice Scalia's executive power separation of powers argument implies a
counterargument to this point of view. If overbroad grants of standing
do, as Justice Scalia claims, transfer the power to enforce the laws from
the President to the courts,'74 then in creating them, Congress transfers
power from a majoritarian branch to an unelected, nonmajoritarian one.
Justice Scalia's 1983 article suggests why he opposes this outcome.'75 If, as
he believes, the role of the courts is to protect minorities, rather than to
vindicate majority interests, 76 then the protection of majority interests
should be left to the majoritarian branches, not sent to the courts. The
problem with this argument is that the President's power and
responsibility to enforce a statute is derived entirely from Congress,
which generates the law and assigns enforcement to a given executive
agency. Congress's decision to grant judicial review of agency action to a
certain plaintiff doesn't deprive the executive of its ability to enforce the
laws. It simply provides a needed check on executive power. That check
furthers not only Congress's intent to grant review, but also its initial
purpose in passing the statute, by ensuring that the Executive's
enforcement is proper. Thus, congressional grants of standing allow the
courts to "require[e] the executive branch
to adhere ...to outcomes that
77
the political process has endorsed.'
The interplay of power between the branches that lies at the heart of
these issues implicates the question of which branch should ultimately
control the standing issue. More specifically, should the judiciary, as the
sole unelected branch, repulse congressional attempts to confer
standing? Both constitutional and prudential reasoning suggest that it

171. Id. at 574 (quoting Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922)).

172. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984) ("This Court has repeatedly held that an
asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to
confer jurisdiction on a federal court.").
173. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan: Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article II,
MICH. L. REV. 163, 217 (1992).

174.
175.
176.
177.

See supra text accompanying note 121.
See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
Scalia, supra note 102, at 895.
Sunstein, supra note 173, at 217.
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should not. Standing is a jurisdictional
"i n
And the
Constitution clearly contemplates significant congressional control over
federal court jurisdiction."9 Congress exercises this power when it creates
a right of action in the federal courts, thus granting the courts jurisdiction
over that particular type of claim.'s' This principle, the elected Congress's
control over the scope of power of the unelected judiciary, is inherently
majoritarian and democratic. For one thing, the people have the power
to rein in the courts if need be.'" For another, they can enlist the courts
to help ensure that the executive is enforcing the law and that the
outcomes serve Congress's ultimate goals."82
Whenever the Court refuses to hear a case over which Congress has
granted it jurisdiction-whether it does so for standing reasons or for
some other reason-it is to some extent infringing upon Congress's
structurally inferred power to employ the judiciary in service of the
popular will. This "judicial abdication" presents a "threat to the values
underlying the principle of congressional control over federal court
jurisdiction" and to the majoritarian values underlying that control. 83
Embedding the standing doctrines in the Constitution is particularly
pernicious in this respect, because it leaves lower courts little room to
defer to Congress's jurisdiction-making role in the future and imposes84
limits on congressional power that are not implied in the Constitution.1
Thus, constitutionalizing the standing doctrines encroaches upon
Congress's jurisdictional power, violating the separation of powers
principle and infringing on the constitutionally implied principle of
democratic control over jurisdiction.'8 ' In reversing this process, Akins
178. Fletcher, supra note 169, at 223 ("[S]tanding is a preliminary jurisdictional requirement,
formulated at a high level of generality and applied across the entire domain of law.").
179. Lauf v. E.G. Shinner and Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) ("There can be no question of the
power of Congress... to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts."). This power is
grounded in (i)Article III's Exceptions and Regulations Clause, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, (2) Article
I's provision granting Congress the power to "constitute inferior tribunals," and (3)Article III's
provision granting Congress the power to "ordain and establish" the lower federal courts. See Lee,
supranote 2, at 613.
i8o. Lee, supra note 2, at 634-35 ("In the context of standing, the congressional control principle
manifests itself in Congress' broad power to create standing by enacting statutory causes of action.").
I81. See id. at 617 ("The institution more reflective of majoritarian sentiment is permitted an
important part in setting the agenda of a powerful but unrepresentative judiciary.").
182. Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function,
94 YALE L.J. 71, 115 (1984) (arguing that Congress's lawmaking power "necessarily includes the
authority to employ the federal judiciary to enforce the substantive statutory programs adopted by
Congress").
183. Lee, supra note 2, at 634-35.
184. See id.at 6o8 (arguing that a constitutional standing doctrine is inconsistent with the principle
of congressional control over federal court jurisdiction).
185. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (asserting that "to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given ... would be treason to the constitution"); Logan, supra note 120, at 42
("When a plaintiff asserts what is in the Court's view a 'generalized grievance,' separation of powers
concerns counsel that the Court consider disposing of the case on prudential rather than article III
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represents a step toward fuller majoritarian control over federal court
jurisdiction.
B.

THE PRUDENTIAL GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES DOCTRINE

Beyond deconstitutionalization, it is difficult to say with certainty
what Akins means for generalized grievances doctrine. In some ways, it
clarifies matters significantly, but in others, the law is still murky. Akins
does establish, more plainly than any prior case had, that a claim is not a
generalized grievance merely by virtue of being widely shared.'86 To help
draw the distinction between valid injuries and generalized grievances,
the Court differentiated between
two types of widely shared injuries,
"abstract" and "concrete.' ',,8 The latter could constitute injury in fact
sufficient to establish standing, while the former could not.' ss The
emphasis on abstract harms is helpful insofar as it clearly classifies
certain types of harms as nonjusticiable. But as described below, Justice
Breyer's argument in the course of developing this theory may indicate a
shift in the definition of a "concrete" injury for Article III purposes, and
it is unclear how far this change goes. At the same time, the Court did
not hold that the widely shared nature of a harm was entirely
irrelevant-but neither did it make clear what the relevance, if any, was.
Because of these ambiguities, Akins ultimately "fails to elucidate the
constitutional boundaries of Congress's ability to confer standing," and
leaves open issues with regards to generalized grievance doctrine.' Even
so, this lack of clarity is not necessarily a bad thing; as discussed below, it
leaves the doctrine more flexible, and that flexibility may provide greater
opportunities for courts to decide cases in accordance with public values.
i.
Ban on Citizen or Taxpayer Standing
Akins does make clear that a plaintiff claiming citizen or taxpayer
standing-that is, one who claims an "injury to the interest in seeing that
the law is obeyed"-does not state a valid claim under Article III
standing jurisprudence."9 Reviewing past cases that discussed the

grounds, reserving for the legislative branch the opportunity to determine [jurisdiction].").
I86. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. I1, 24 (1998) (holding that widely shared interests
"may count as an injury in fact"). This point was hardly new. See Albert, supra note 59, at 487-88
(arguing that "collective harms" may qualify as constitutional injury and that the "size of the injured
group" is not relevant to the issue of whether there is injury). However, it appears that no Supreme
Court majority opinion had ever explicitly made it before Akins.
187. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23-24.
88. Id. The difference between "concrete" and "abstract" harms is discussed in detail infra Part
III.B.2.
189. Leading Cases, supra note 13, at 253, 262 (analyzing Akins as failing "to articulate the outer
limits of Congress's power to confer standing").
t9o. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23-24; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note i, at 91 ("The prohibition against
generalized grievances prevents individuals from suing if their only injury is as a citizen or a
taxpayer....").
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generalized grievances issue, the Court concluded that in cases where the
Court denied standing to a widely shared harm, it did so not because the
harm was widely shared, but because it was "abstract.' 9 ' Justice Breyer
defined "abstract" injuries as "injury to interest in seeing that certain
procedures are followed," or as injury to "'the public's interest in the
administration of the law."". 9. Such injuries have in common mainly that
they are not based in a common law or statutory right, but only in a
vague idea that some injustice exists and should be redressed. The Court
added that such claims are problematic because they would allow a
plaintiff to "obtain[] what would, in effect, amount to an advisory
opinion.""'
The prohibition on abstract interests probably means that a
plaintiff's claim must derive from a statute or common law provision.
Such a provision outlines an injury with "concrete specificity" against
which the court can measure the extent of the harm to the plaintiff.'"4
Any claim not based on such a source must be seeking to vindicate the
"'common concern for obedience to law"' shared by all citizens or
taxpayers, and is prohibited.'95 Akins reaffirms that such claims do not
establish injury for standing purposes." 6 This point of view is not
inconsistent with the dominant private rights view of jurisprudence.
Without a source of law against which to judge the scope of the injury,
the Court implied, it would simply be adjudicating the correctness of the
challenged law rather than deciding a case or controversy between two
parties.
2.
Defining Concreteness
Because Akins defines "concrete" interests in contrast to abstract
ones, it suggests that all non-abstract interests satisfy the concreteness
prerequisite for Article III injury in fact." This is a strong rhetorical
191. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24.
192. Id. at 23-24 (citing Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940)).
193. Id. at 24.

194. See id.
195. Id. at 23. (quoting Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 311 U.S. 295,303 (94o)). It is worth
noting that the Court has never explained very thoroughly why it believes citizen and taxpayer
standing are problematic. One possible objection to them is that the mechanism by which the violation
of the law harmed the plaintiff is so difficult to discern that the Court has no basis for evaluating or
measuring whether an injury actually occurred. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54 . A structural
constitutional objection is also possible: citizen and taxpayer standing may violate separation of
powers by invoking the power of the non-majoritarian branch of the government to overturn
majoritarian outcomes dictated by statute or the Constitution, thereby undermining the authority of
Congress to make the laws. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § i.Probably the best objection, though, is
prudential: the multiplicity of lawsuits that could result if anyone could challenge any alleged violation
of the law could overwhelm the courts and crowd out claims by parties who have been personally and
severely harmed by the actions of others.
196. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24.
197. See id. at 23-25.
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move, because it suggests that simply by establishing that an interest is
not abstract-that it is not citizen or taxpayer standing-it clears one of
the primary hurdles involved in establishing Article III injury in fact.
This syllogism constitutes a significant shift in the definition of
concreteness in the Article III context, however, from a solid, palpable
injury, to an injury to an interest defined by a common law or statute.
The everyday meaning of "concrete" is "specific," "particular,"
"real," or "tangible."' Prior to Akins, the Court had explained the
concreteness requirement consistently with this definition, declaring that
the plaintiff had to show "concrete facts demonstrating that the
challenged practices harm him. '""9 Yet Justice Breyer's opinion defines
concreteness very differently. Unlike an abstract interest, a concrete
interest, according to Akins, is based either on a "common-law injury,"
such as tort law providing for redress of physical harm, or on "rights
conferred by law," such as the plaintiff's statutory right to information in
Akins. ' The tangibility of the harm is not the key issue. Rather, what
matters is the source of the right whose violation constitutes the injury.
The injury is concrete when the right to redress is clearly articulated by
pre-existing law, regardless of the nature of the harm itself. This suggests
that the first question to ask in analyzing a generalized grievances
problem is whether the plaintiff claims injury to a valid, pre-existing legal
right. By establishing that there is, and therefore that the injury is
concrete, we also partially answer the question of whether there is injury
in fact."0 '
However, nothing in Akins suggests that a tangible common law or
statutory interest is sufficient, by itself, to establish standing. Such an
injury is sufficient to satisfy the "concreteness" element of injury in fact,
but, presumably, the other elements must also be satisfied. Indeed,
Justice Scalia argued as much in his dissent."' Although he seemingly
acceded to the majority's labeling of the harms in Akins as concrete, he
argued that they were nevertheless nonjusticiable because they were not
particularized.0 Moreover, it is not clear that the Court has employed

198. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 23 9 (IOth ed. 1994).
199. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,508 (975).

2o0. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24. Justice Frankfurter had identified the same two possible sources for a
valid injury several decades earlier. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
152 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that standing could be based on "a governmental
action ... that, if taken by a private person, would create a right of action cognizable by the courts," or
"on an interest created by the Constitution or a statute").
201. Cf. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 492 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recommending a similar approach to
determining injury in fact).
202. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 34-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 34-36.
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this definition of concreteness outside the factual context of Akins.",
3. The Persistenceof the Widely-Shared Problem
The key uncertainty in Akins lies with the ambiguous way the Court
handles the issue of widely shared harms. Justice Breyer wrote, as
already noted, that widely shared injuries may still be valid claims under
Article III. Some commentators have suggested that the Court was
advocating recognition of any widely shared harm, so long as it is
"concrete"-that is, grounded in a statute or in common law? 5 But the
opinion carefully avoids this !explicit holding, so a more nuanced reading
seems proper.
Justice Breyer noted that the widely shared nature of an injury
"counsel[s] against ... interpreting a statute as conferring standing......
This suggests that the widely-shared factor is still independently relevant
in the standing calculus, although it does not suggest when it might be
relevant. He further explained that the availability of a political forum to
address widely shared harms "does not, by itself, automatically" mean
that the harm is not an Article III injury.2" While these caveats indicate
that the availability of a political forum does not decide the standing
issue on its own, they also signify that it is a factor that should somehow
enter into the standing decision. The Court also stated that "such a[]
[widely shared] interest...
may count as an 'injury in fact"' if
"sufficiently concrete. ' 8 That a widely shared harm "may"-not
"will"-count as injury in fact if it is concrete implies that even if it is
concrete, the courts may still sometimes deny standing precisely because
an injury is too widely shared.
Ironically, the widely shared nature of the harm had not been the
core of the doctrine when it was first announced,"° and the Court had
since held that the widely shared nature of a harm did not cause it to be
nonjusticiable." '° Yet here we see Akins subtly reviving the widely-shared
204. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 18o-84 (2ooo)
(analyzing injury in fact without reference to whether the statute created a legal right to be free of the
alleged injury).
205. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note io9, at 644 (arguing that Akins modifies standing doctrine so
that "Congress is entirely authorized to grant standing to individuals who share an injury with many
other people, even with all citizens"); Leading Cases, supra note 13, at 259. Recent circuit court cases
involving standing issues commonly cite Akins for this proposition. See, e.g., Lac Du Flambeau Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 422 F.3d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 2005); Covington v.
Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 651 (9th Cir. 2004). The idea that the widely shared nature of a harm
should be completely irrelevant to standing is hardly new. See Albert, supra note 59, at 487-88 ("The
size of the injured group is no more relevant.., than the severity or kind of injury. Conceivably, a
potential plaintiff class could include the entire population.").
2o6. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24.
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
210. Of course, as noted supra note 23 and accompanying text, the Court has vacillated on this
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concept by suggesting that, under some unspecified circumstances, a
court could consider the widely shared nature of a harm as a factor in
denying standing. At the same time, nothing in Akins suggests how
courts should decide whether the widely shared nature of a given claim
matters, or how it should be weighed against other factors in the standing
calculus. In particular, it is not clear whether concrete claims may ever be
denied on the grounds that they are too widely shared, or, if so, when.
To deny standing because a harm is widely shared raises important
issues of fundamental justice."' But it also poses a significant doctrinal
problem: it requires identifying what harms are widely shared, which in
turn depends on whether the harm is defined broadly or narrowly. For
instance, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court held that the
plaintiffs' claimed interest in viewing endangered animals was not
sufficient to constitute injury in fact." 2 Should widely shared in Lujan
have been defined broadly, as "an interest shared by everyone who could
potentially want to see the animals at some point" or narrowly, as "an
interest shared by everyone who is actually likely to view the animals
during some specified time period"? Under the broader definition, the
plaintiffs' interest would have been widely shared, because almost
everyone in the country might have wanted to view the animals at some
point. Under the narrower definition, it probably would not have been,
because the narrowly defined group was likely to have been much
smaller.
It would be difficult-perhaps futile-to attempt to provide a
sufficiently precise definition for widely shared to suggest a resolution for
the broad range of factual situations judges are likely to encounter. Thus,
even if Akins did offer some clue as to how judges should use the widelyshared factor in their standing decisions, it would still leave the problem
of defining widely shared harms to individual judges in individual cases.
Both the definition and the relevance of the widely-shared factor are
therefore left to judicial discretion.
4. The Pitfalls and Benefits of a Flexible Doctrine
The doctrine that emerges from this analysis lies in an indefinite
position between extremes. A generalized grievance is not simply widely
shared. However, the doctrine does preclude traditional citizen and
taxpayer suits that imply a right of action on the part of all or nearly all
citizens. Furthermore, the doctrine is prudential. The key areas for
judicial discretion are (i) how to determine when a harm is widely
shared, and (2) when and to what extent the widely shared nature of a
harm is relevant in the standing decision. Moreover, the Court has given
issue.
211.

See supra note 142 and accompanying text.

212. 504

U.S. 555, 563-568 (1992).
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the lower courts little guidance as to how they should exercise that
discretion.
The interpretive leeway permitted by the Court's opinion in Akins
raises the specter of results-oriented judging. As Justice Rehnquist
complained in another context, the Court's failure to define the widelyshared concept more definitively may "invite subjective judicial
preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation." ' 3 In
fact, Justice Scalia has explained that he favors firm rules that bind
judges for just this reason."4 Such rules, he believes, prevent judges from
subordinating pure legal analysis (whatever that may be) to their own
personal policy preferences." 5
Most lawyers, judges, academics and law students would doubtless
agree that results-oriented judging is a real phenomenon. In point of fact,
this problem-if indeed it is a problem-is so ubiquitous that one might
question Justice Scalia's premise that hard and fast rules tend to restrain
judges. After all, one could argue that many courts manage to announce
a clear rule of black letter law while at the same time engaging in resultsoriented judging. Perhaps this is so because judges may indulge their
policy preferences not only through manipulation of applicable legal
rules and standards, as Justice Scalia fears, but also by choosing which
legal rules and standards to apply. Justice Breyer has made precisely this
argument. ' He points out that an emphasis on bright line rules does not
relieve judges of the need to choose between and interpret rules, a
process that, he claims, may be as fraught with subjectivity as making a
decision without a clear rule as guidance."' Moreover, a judge making a
decision without reference to a clear legal rule is still bound by her own
values as well as by a "need for consistency over time. '' 8 Thus, the
absence of a hard and fast rule for generalized grievances (or for
anything else) does not necessarily increase the likelihood of resultsoriented decision making.
Some things may necessarily remain unclear when the Court
attempts to vindicate public values through standing jurisprudence. But
this lack of clarity can be a boon to public values adjudication rather than
a hindrance. A private rights view favors bright lines, which in the case of
standing means excluding certain plaintiffs definitively in the interest of
focusing judicial attention on the most adversarial of cases. But a public
values view of standing may function better when there are fewer
213.
214.

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REV. 1175, 1179-80

(1989).
215.

See id. at 118o. ("Only by announcing rules do we judges hedge ourselves in.").

216. Breyer, Our DemocraticConstitution, supra note 161, at 270.
217. See id.
218. Id.
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restrictions on standing. Judges will have more freedom to vindicate the
public interest if the doctrine allows for some inconsistency of
application. Thus, to the extent that it serves a public values view, Justice
Breyer's doctrine perhaps works better, in the sense of serving public
values, for the fact that it is loosely defined.
IV. POST-AKiNS DEVELOPMENTS

A.

SUPREME COURT CASES

The Supreme Court has not decided a major generalized grievances
case since Akins. In fact, the Court has mentioned the doctrine only five
times in recent years.219 In no recent case has the Court overturned a
grant of standing on the grounds that it was a generalized grievance.2"
(In fact, the Court has not done that since Lujan.221 ) However, its
discussions of generalized grievances in recent cases indicate that it has
accepted and continues to apply the analytical framework outlined in
Akins.
In Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, for example,
Justice Stevens' majority opinion explicitly reaffirms the two least
controvertible holdings of Akins: that a claim is not nonjusticiable merely
by virtue of being widely shared; and that plaintiffs do not have standing
when they seek to vindicate a nonpersonal interest in ensuring that
government follows the law.22 Justice Stevens' mention of generalized
grievances in his dissent in Vieth v. Jubelireris also consistent with Akins.
There, he explained his view that a plaintiff claiming an equal protection
violation as a result of gerrymandering of congressional districts did not
state a valid injury unless she herself was a resident of the
gerrymandered district. 23 To hold otherwise, he argued, would be to
allow the plaintiff to assert "only a generalized grievance against
219. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1453, 1456 (2007); Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. I, 12 (2004); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 330 (2004)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. i, 7 (2002), Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 204 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22o. Among the cases cited supra note 219, only Massachusetts v. EPA, Elk Grove and Devlin

actually discuss the doctrine in a majority opinion as a potential ground for deciding the case, and
none of the three actually decides the case on generalized grievances grounds. See Massachusetts v.
EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1453-56; Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at12; Devlin, 536 U.S. at 7.
221. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-577 (1992). But see United States v.
Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743-44 (995) (discussing the doctrine as a ground for rejecting one of the
appellant's claims, even though that rejection didn't decide the case). Even in Lujan, one could argue
that the discussion of generalized grievances was dictum; the case may have been decided on injury
grounds. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562, 573-577.
222. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1453, 1456. This case never actually uses the term

"generalized grievances," but it is clear from Justice Stevens' use of the term "widely shared," and his
citation to Akins, that he had the doctrine firmly in mind when composing the majority opinion. See id.
at 1456.
223. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 330 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing Hays, 515 U.S. at 745).
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governmental conduct of which he or she does not approve,"' that is, the
construction of a district in which she has no personal interest.224 Justice
Stevens appeared to be saying that such a claim was abstract in the Akins
sense, because no common law principle or statute grants a right for
redress of an equal protection violation suffered by another person.
Thus, an attempt to claim injury in fact based on such a harm is in
essence a prohibited attempt to claim citizen standing.
Notably, the Court in these cases never seriously considers any
constitutional basis for the doctrine. Both Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, and Justice
O'Connor, writing in Devlin v. Scardelletti, clearly classify it as
prudential, lumping it in with third-party standing and the zone-ofinterests tests as one of a troika of prudential standing hurdles.225 Thus,
the Court has affirmed the deconstitutionalization of the doctrine
effected by Akins. In fact, Justice Stevens goes out of his way to point out
in Elk Grove that the doctrine is not constitutionally compelled, quoting
the Court's statement in Warth that prudential doctrines are "closely
related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters of judicial selfgovernance. ''2 6 This indicates that Justice Scalia has definitively lost the
constitutionalization argument, at least for now.
While there is nothing in these cases that advances, clarifies, or
upsets anything in Akins, they do indicate that the Court is continuing to
follow the doctrinal path that Justice Breyer laid out. Any elaboration of
the doctrine, particularly with regard to the still-troublesome issue of
widely shared harms, must wait for another high court case that squarely
presents the issue or must come from the lower courts.
B.

APPLICATIONS BY COURTS OF APPEALS

A number of circuit courts have dealt with issues related to the
generalized grievances doctrine since Akins was decided. 29 I classify the
resulting cases into one of two broad categories: those analyzing the
source of the legal interest at stake, and those addressing the relevance
of the widely shared nature of the harm. The legal interest cases indicate
that the lower courts have adopted Akins' definition of concreteness and
Id. (quoting Hays, 515 U.S. at 745).
225. See Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 12 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (I984)); Devlin, 536
U.S. at 7 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751).
226. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 12 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (I975)).
227. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hays, 515 U.S. at 745).
224.

228.

Id.

229. See, e.g., Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 422 F.3d 490,
496 (7th Cir. 2005); Am. Canoe Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Louisa Water and Sewer Comm'n, 389 F.3d 536,
545-46 (6th Cir. 2004); Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3 d 625, 629, 633-36 (2d Cir. 2003); Pye v. United
States, 269 F. 3 d 459, 469 (4 th Cir. 2001); Becker v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 230 F.3d 381, 389-90 (ist
Cir. 2000); DeMando v. Morris, 206 F.3d 1300, 1303 ( 9 th Cir. 2000).
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are evaluating claims based on the presence or absence of statutory or
common law rights. Those dealing with the widely-shared issue show that
courts are not abusing the leeway Akins allows them in interpreting that
term.
American Canoe Ass'n v. City of Louisa Water and Sewer
Commission contains the most detailed analysis among the cases
addressing the legal interest issue.23 The Sixth Circuit held that plaintiff
environmental groups had standing when they claimed that their
organizational interests were injured by defendants' failure to comply
with the monitoring and reporting requirements of its Clean Water Act
permit. 3 ' In doing so, the court distinguished between concrete and
abstract injury, as in Akins.23 It explained that the plaintiffs' injury was
concrete because the monitoring and reporting requirements constituted
"information that the defendants are allegedly under a legal obligation to
provide." '33 Because the claimed injury was based on the defendants'
violation of this specific statutory requirement, it was not abstract, but
concrete, and constituted an Article III injury in fact."3
In contrast, the court in Becker v. Federal Election Commission
denied standing to voters who claimed that certain Federal Election
Commission regulations violated the Federal Election Campaign Act. 3'
It held that the plaintiffs' claim of injury based on "corruption of the
political process allegedly caused by" the Commission's violations was a
generalized grievance because, unlike the claim in Akins, it was not
grounded on a specific statutory right to sue.236 Such a claim, the court
'
found, was "of an abstract and indefinite nature. 37
Both of these cases are correctly decided under Akins'
concrete/abstract distinction. The case for concreteness in American
Canoe was not quite as strong as in Akins. The statute in Akins explicitly
provided for a right of action for a denial of information, while the Clean8
Water Act, at issue in American Canoe, does not provide such a right.3
Still, the court properly looked to the statute for a right whose violation
could constitute injury, and finding a right to information under the
230.

389 F.3d at 546.

231.

Id.

232.

Id. at 545-46.

233. Id. at 545.
234. Id. at 545-46.
235. Becker v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 230 F.3d 381,389-9 ° (ist Cir. 2000).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 390.
238. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 437(g)(8) (providing a cause of action under the Federal Election
Campaign Act, at issue in Akins), with 33 U.S.C. §§ t318(a)-(b) (monitoring and reporting
requirements of the Clean Water Act, requiring reporting but not providing for a cause of action for
failure to report), and 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, providing a
general cause of action for violations of the Act).
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statute, allowed the claim under the Act's general citizen suit provision.
The plaintiffs in Becker, conversely, could not allege the violation of any
statutory or common law right, and thus, the court properly denied their
claim.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians v. Norton is typical among recent cases that
employ the widely-shared concept.239 An Indian tribe had brought an
Administrative Procedure Act challenge to an Indian Gaming Compact,
arguing that by entering into the compact the Secretary had violated a
fiduciary duty to treat all tribes equally.24 The government argued that
because the alleged harm was shared equally by all tribes in the state, it
was not sufficiently particularized to constitute a valid injury in fact. 4'
The court rejected this argument, finding that the alleged harm was
concrete though widely shared, like the injury in Akins, because each
tribe could allege economic harm to itself from the Secretary's actions."
The case therefore represents a fairly straightforward application of
Akins' principle that widely shared harms "may count as an 'injury in
fact.'"43
Baur v. Veneman involves a much more widely shared harm and
subtly modifies the holding of Akins.' Baur claimed injury in fact based
on an increased risk of mad cow disease allegedly resulting from
Department of Agriculture rules regarding the use of "downed" cattle
for food. 5 The court acknowledged that the harm was widely shared.46
Everyone in the country who ate beef could potentially claim the same
injury. But it also noted that "[t]he fact that many other citizens could
' 47
assert the same injury, by itself, is not sufficient to defeat standing.
Because Baur "allege[d] a discrete, individual risk of personal harm," his
injury was "sufficiently concrete and particularized" rather than abstract,
and the court held that he had standing.248 This language may be.
significant. Justice Breyer did not say in Akins that a harm is not widely
shared if it is both "concrete and particularized." 49 The majority opinion
in Akins certainly discusses the concrete concept, 20 but as Justice Scalia
scornfully pointed out in his Akins dissent, it does not even mention the
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

422 F. 3 d 490,492-94 (7th Cir. 2005).

Id.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 496-97.
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998).
352 F.3d 625, 628 (2d Cir. 2003).

Id.
246. Id. at 635.
247. Id. at 635 n.9.

248. Id. at 635.
249. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998).

250. See id.
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word "particularized." 5 ' By bringing particularity into the discussion, the
Baur court actually introduced another hurdle into the standing calculus
for the plaintiff to overcome: for his widely shared injury to be valid, the
court seemed to require Baur to show that his injury was not just
concrete, but also particularized. 5 2 Perhaps the court simply failed to
choose its words correctly. But if the "particularized" reference was
intended to be taken seriously, we can explain it by reference to the
breadth of the injury Baur was asking the court to recognize. Before it
granted standing that could potentially extend to all beef eaters, the
court may have wanted to be sure that the name plaintiff had a strong
personal interest in the matter. On the other hand, the case also makes
sense from a public values perspective. The court found that the statute
at issue was intended to protect the public from unsafe food. 53 Baur's
claim, therefore, asked the court to allow the use of the courts to
vindicate the majoritarian policy goal of making the meat supply safer,
and the court did so.254 As in Akins, granting standing to a widely shared
harm served to give effect to the congressional intent behind the relevant
statute.
Overall, these examples suggest that the courts of appeals have
applied Akins' articulation of the generalized-grievances doctrine
carefully and with good judgment. The results in each case are not only
consistent with Akins itself, but also with common sense ideas of basic
justice. Thus far, at least, the courts do not appear to have misused the
discretion that the prudential doctrine under Akins allows them.
CONCLUSION

Although certain important details of the generalized-grievances
doctrine remain unresolved, Akins allows us a reasonably good
understanding of the doctrine at its core. On the one hand, it allows some
widely shared harms to be justiciable; on the other hand, it prohibits
"abstract" claims not grounded in a common law or statutory right. And
it is not constitutionally compelled.
To the extent that it is still unclear when judges may use their
discretion to deny standing to a widely shared harm, it is admittedly
possible that some courts may in the future "employ the rhetoric of
'standing"' in a "dissembling enterprise" to serve their own personal
policy preferences.255 Results-oriented judging may in fact be particularly

251. See id. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What is noticeably lacking in the Court's discussion of
our generalized-grievance jurisprudence is all reference to two words that have figured in it
prominently: 'particularized' and 'undifferentiated."').
252. See Baur, 352 F.3 d at 635.
253. Id. at 634 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 602 (20o3)).
254. Id. at 635.
255. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
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likely to occur in standing cases. The "elusive nature of all justiciability
issues '256 leaves greater room for judicial discretion in this area of law
regardless of whether the rule is flexible or strict. So when standing rules
are flexible, the inherent subjectivity involved in all standing decisions
magnifies the potential for subjective interpretation that results from the
flexibility of the rule.
Still, results-oriented judging does not appear to be causing a
problem in the context of contemporary generalized grievances doctrine.
The lower courts have implemented Akins in a consistent and principled
manner, considering the ambiguity intrinsic in the case. 57 Given this
outcome, hindsight suggests that the prudential generalized-grievances
doctrine as outlined in Akins is serving the public well, even though it
incidentally leaves more room for results-oriented judging than a
doctrine that errs on the side of reliability by excluding some deserving
claims. Predictability and consistency are important values underlying
doctrines such as stare decisis. But an overemphasis on stability,
particularly in the standing context, may lead to stagnation, and
occasionally to injustice.? Until and unless federal judges prove
themselves incapable of applying Akins even-handedly, we should not
shun a generalized-grievances rule that allows for some judicial
discretion. As Justice Breyer noted in reference to the overturning of
Plessy v. Ferguson59 by Brown v. Board of Education,"6 "[a] court

focused on consequences may decide a case in ' a6 way that radically
changes the law. But this is not always a bad thing. 2 1

454 U.S. 464,493 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
256. Logan, supra note 120, at 40.
257. See supra Part IV.B.
258. See supra note 142.
259. 163 U.S. 537 (I896).
260. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

26I.

BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra

note 161, at 119.

